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Many potential adversaries seek, or already have theater ballistic missiles capable 
of threatening targets of interest to the United States.  The U.S. Missile Defense Agency 
and armed forces are developing and fielding missile interceptors carried by many 
different platforms, including ships, aircraft, and ground units.  Given some exigent 
threat, the U.S. must decide where to position defensive platforms and how they should 
engage potential belligerent missile attacks.  To plan such defenses, the Navy uses its 
Area Air Defense Commander (AADC) system afloat and ashore, the Air Force has its 
Theater Battle Management Core Systems (TBMCS) used in air operations centers, and 
the Missile Defense Agency uses the Commander’s Analysis and Planning Simulation 
(CAPS).   AADC uses a server farm to exhaustively enumerate potential enemy launch 
points, missiles, threatened targets, and interceptor platform positions.  TBMCS 
automates a heuristic cookie-cutter overlay of potential launch fans by defensive 
interceptor envelopes.  Given a complete missile attack plan and a responding defense, 
CAPS assesses the engagement geometry and resulting coverage against manually 
prepared attack scenarios and defense designs.  We express the enemy courses of action 
as a mathematical optimization to maximize expected damage, and then show how to 
optimize our defensive interceptor pre-positioning to minimize the maximum achievable 
expected damage.  We can evaluate exchanges where each of our defending platform 
locations and interceptor commitments are hidden from, or known in advance by the 
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LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
(This is the lexicon of theater ballistic missile defense.  Not all of these terms 
appear herein, but they are essential to deciphering our references.) 
 
AADC Area Air Defense Commander 
AADC-S Area Air Defense Commander - System 
AAW Anti-Air Warfare 
ABMA Automated Battle Management Aid 
ABL Airborne Laser 
ABT Air-breather Threat 
ACA Airspace Control Authority 
ACTD Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration 
ADAAM Air-Directed Air-to-Air Missile 
ADP Air Defense Plan 
ADSAM Air-Directed Surface-to-Air Missile 
AEW Airborne Early Warning 
APOD Aerial Port of Debarkation 
ASCM Anti-Ship Cruise Missile 
ASMD Anti-Ship Missile Defense 
ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare 
ATD Advanced Technology Demonstration 
ATR Automated Target Recognition 
 
BMC4I Battle Management / Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers & Intelligence 
BMD Ballistic Missile Defense 
 
C2 Command and Control 
C4I Command, Control, Communications, Computers & Intelligence 
C4ISR Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
  
CA Critical Asset 
CBR Chemical, Biological and Radiological 
CCID Composite Combat Identification 
CEC Cooperative Engagement Capability 
CID Combat Identification 
CM Cruise Missile 
CMD Cruise Missile Defense 
CNA Computer Network Attack 
CNO Chief of Naval Operations 
COA Course of Action 
COP Common Operational Picture 
 xiii
COTS Commercial Off-the-Shelf 
CRD Capstone Requirements Document 
CTE Common Threat Evaluation 
CTP Common Tactical Picture 
CVBG Aircraft Carrier Battle Group 
CVRT Criticality, Vulnerability, Reconstitutability & Threat 
 
DAL Defended Asset List 
DCA Defensive Counter air 
DEW Directed Energy Weapon 
DoD Department of Defense 
DOTMLP-F Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel 
& Facilities 
DRM Design Reference Mission 
DSC Distributed Sensor Coordination 
DWC Distributed Weapons Coordination 
 
EA Electronic Attack 
ECOA Enemy Course of Action 
EOB Enemy Order of Battle 
ES Electronic Support 
EW Electronic Warfare 
 
FDO Flexible Deterrent Option 
FEZ Fighter Engagement Zone 
FOB Friendly Order of Battle 
FNC Future Naval Capability 
 
GBI Ground Based Interceptor 
GBR Ground Based Radar 
 
HVA High Value Asset 
HVAA High Value Airborne Asset 
 
IBCT Interim Brigade Combat Team 
ID Identification 
IFF Identification Friend or Foe 
IFC Integrated Fire Control 
IO Information Operations  
IPB Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (or Battlespace) 
IRBM Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile 
IRST Infrared Search and Track 




JCTN Joint Composite Tracking Network 
JDN Joint Data Network  
JEZ Joint Engagement Zone 
JFACC Joint Force Air Component Commander 
JFC Joint Force Commander 
JFMCC Joint Force Maritime Component Commander 
JIAD Joint Integrated Air Defense 
JPN Joint Planning Network 
JTAMD Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense  
JTAMDO  Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization 
 
LACM Land Attack Cruise Missile  
LACMD Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense 
 
MD Missile Defense 
MEZ Missile Engagement Zone 
MIDAS Multifunction Infrared Distributed Aperture System 
MOE Measure(s) of Effectiveness 
MOP Measure(s) of Performance 
MOS Measure(s) of Success 
MOU Memorandum of Understanding 
MRBM Medium Range Ballistic Missile 
 
NCO Network Centric Operations 
NTW Navy Theater-Wide (Ballistic Missile Defense Program) 
 
OCA Offensive Counter Air 
OCM Overland Cruise Missile  
OCMD Overland Cruise Missile Defense 
OMFTS Operational Maneuver From The Sea 
OPDEC Operational Deception 
OPSEC Operational Security 
 
PI Probability of Interception  
PID Probability of Identification 
PKSS Probability of Single-Shot Kill 
PNEG Probability of Negation 
PAC-3 PATRIOT Advanced Capability 3 
POD Port of Debarkation 
PSR Preferred Shooter Recommendation 
 
RADC Regional Air Defense Commander 
RMP Radar Modernization Program 
ROE Rules of Engagement  
RSTA Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Targeting and Assessment 
 xv
 
S&T Science and Technology 
SADC Sector Air Defense Commander 
SHORAD Short Range Air Defense 
SIAP Single Integrated Air Picture 
SM STANDARD Missile 
SOF Special Operations Forces 
SPAWARSYSCOM Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command 
SPOD Seaport of Debarkation 
SRBM Short Range Ballistic Missile 
STOM Ship to Objective Maneuver  
 
TAD Theater Air Defense 
TAMD Theater Air and Missile Defense 
TBM Theater Ballistic Missile 
TBMD Theater Ballistic Missile Defense 
TDMP Test and Demonstration Master Plan 
TEL Transporter, Erector, Launcher 
TEWA Threat Evaluation / Weapon Assignment Project 
THAAD Theater High Altitude Air Defense 
TLAM Tomahawk Land Attack Missile 
TM Theater Missile 
TMD Theater Missile Defense 
TST Time Sensitive Target(ing) 
 
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
UCAV Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle 
UESA UHF Electronically Scanned Array  
UHF Ultra High Frequency 
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Theater ballistic missiles (TBM) are capable of delivering high-explosive 
warheads as well as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, termed "weapons of mass 
destruction."  Adversaries already have, or are developing these deadly devices, so the 
United States is developing defensive interceptors and tactics to maximize the probability 
of defeating all incoming ballistic missile threats.  The goal is to thwart even a small 
nuclear, chemical or biological strike on a target city or military site. 
 Theater ballistic missile defense has become an important component of the 
Department of Defense research and development budget, whose requests for fiscal year 
2005 exceed ten billion dollars for joint missile defense programs. 
Soon a joint forces commander will have at his disposal a number of defensive 
interceptors, including ground-based THAAD and PATRIOT missile batteries, sea-based 
AEGIS ships, and aircraft that will be used to intercept an anticipated enemy ballistic 
missile attack.  The commander needs quick and accurate recommendations for the 
advantageous positioning of joint forces to intercept ballistic missile threats. 
The following programmed systems will be used for ballistic missile defense.  
The Army’s PATRIOT consists of a mobile launcher, a phased array air search and 
tracking radar, and various command and support vehicles and is capable of firing three 
types of interceptor missiles, providing terminal defense against ballistic missiles, cruise 
missiles and aircraft.  The Army’s Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system 
will provide a midcourse-high altitude defense of ballistic missiles using a kinetic-kill 
interceptor.  The Navy has deployed the Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruisers and 
Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers.  Each of these ships has the AEGIS SPY-
1 phased array radar and can function as a ballistic missile interceptor platform.  The Air 
Force is developing the Airborne Laser (ABL), a chemical laser housed in a 747 aircraft 
that will provide boost phase defense against ballistic missiles.  The ABL is not 
considered for our planning scenario, however adding the ABL, or any other ballistic 
missile defense system, is trivial. 
 xix
The Department of Defense is currently using these planning tools to mitigate the 
ballistic missile threat: the Area Air Defense Commander (AADC) System (AN/UYQ-
89), the Theater Battle Management Core Systems (TBMCS) and the Commander’s 
Analysis and Planning Simulation (CAPS).   
The Navy’s Area Air Defense Commander (AADC) System deployed on 
command ships USS BLUERIDGE, USS MOUNT WHITNEY, the AEGIS cruiser USS 
SHILOH and at the Joint National Integration Center (JNIC) in Colorado. 
AADC consists of a planning and operations module that allows air defense 
commanders to plan and war-game many “what-if” scenarios, analyze proposed 
defensive interceptor positioning, and monitor current events in near real-time on a three-
dimensional projection of the battle space.  AADC uses a server farm to exhaustively 
enumerate defensive solutions that consist of every feasible attack combination of enemy 
launch point, defended asset and friendly interceptor platform position to a high degree of 
fidelity.   
Theater Battle Management Core Systems (TBMCS) is used by U.S. Air Force air 
operations centers for theater-level planning in support of the Area Air Defense 
Commander.  TBMCS supports strategic planning, air battle planning, mission 
preparation, mission execution and reporting and analysis on near real-time situations as 
they unfold.  TBMCS automates a heuristic cookie-cutter overlay of potential launch fans 
by defensive interceptor envelopes; this heuristic suggests a face-valid solution, but one 
of unknown quality.   
Commander’s Analysis and Planning Simulation (CAPS) was developed by 
SPARTA, Inc. for the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) in 1993.  CAPS is used to assess 
defense system capabilities and positioning, develop a defense design, and to test the 
performance of the defense design over a hypothesized, manually-prepared threat 
scenario with respect to a manually-prepared defense design.  
All three of these fielded systems solve the complex problem of ballistic missile 
defense in very different ways, with varying degrees of fidelity, and with differing 
objectives. 
 xx
We express enemy courses of action as a mathematical optimization to maximize 
expected damage, and then show how to optimize our defensive asset prepositioning to 
minimize the maximum achievable expected damage.  The problem is to optimize 
defensive positioning for attack interception while (perhaps) assuming the attacker will 
observe these preparations and optimize attacks to exploit any weaknesses in these 
defenses.  Our objective is to minimize the maximum total expected damage to targets. 
The resulting mathematical formulation is an integer linear program that 
recommends optimal stationing locations and interdictions for defender assets by 
minimizing the enemies’ ability to inflict damage.  Defender optimal interdiction strategy 
accounts for the launch sites of the attack, the missile types used and the targets attacked.  
Additionally, we balance interceptor capabilities and defender platform inventory to 
minimize the expected damage inflicted by enemy ballistic missiles that penetrate the air 
defenses.  Defender interdiction strategy is further constrained by linking interceptor 
capabilities to the oblate spherical triangle formed by the geographic coordinates of the 
attacker launch site, target, and defender location, which depend on the attack the enemy 
chooses.  The result is an integer linear program that recommends optimal stationing 
positions for defender platforms that minimize the maximum expected damage of an 
enemy attack.   
For planning purposes, we develop a North Korean scenario set in 2010 
consisting of sixteen launch sites, five missile types threatening twelve targets in South 
Korea, Japan and Okinawa.  Facing this threat we have two AEGIS cruisers, one AEGIS 
destroyer, one PATRIOT battery and one THAAD battery.  Each defender platform is 
allocated a loadout combination of six interceptor types. 
The results of our model include a maximal attack with no defense, a defense of 
this attack, a two-sided attack where we assume that the attacker and defender can see 
each other’s preparations and react accordingly, and a two-sided attack where we are able 
to keep some of our defenders hidden from the attacker. 
We propose a decision support tool that can offer provably optimal interception 
plans on a laptop computer in minutes.  These integer linear programs can be solved 
 xxi
faster, and can be expected to find a near-optimal solution.  The space and power 
requirements for our solution are trivial.  The Joint Task Force’s Area Air Defense 
Commander (AADC) and Regional Air Defense Commander (RADC) may use the 
decision support tool for initial defense planning and assessment.  In addition it could 



















I. THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE PARDIGM 
A.  THE THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT  
Theater ballistic missiles (TBM) are capable of delivering high-explosive 
warheads as well as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, termed "weapons of mass 
destruction."  Adversaries already have, or are developing these deadly devices, so the 
United States is developing defensive interceptors and tactics to maximize the probability 
of defeating all incoming ballistic missiles.  The goal is to thwart even a small nuclear, 
chemical or biological strike on a target city or military site. 
 Theater ballistic missile defense has become an important component of the 
Department of Defense research and development budget, whose requests for fiscal year 
2005 exceed ten billion dollars for joint missile defense programs [DoD 2005]. 
Soon joint forces commanders will have a number of defensive interceptors, 
including ground-based THAAD and PATRIOT missile batteries, sea-based AEGIS 
ships, and aircraft, which will be used to intercept an anticipated enemy ballistic missile 
attack.  The joint forces commander needs quick and accurate recommendations for the 
advantageous positioning of joint forces to intercept ballistic missile threats.   
 
 
Figure 1. Current ballistic missile threats   
Shown left to right, a few of the threat missiles in existence today: Scud-B Transporter-




B.  A CASE STUDY: NORTH KOREA TODAY 
North Korea is known to be developing and exporting ballistic missiles and 
missile technology and has numerous indigenous missile production facilities and 
prepared launching sites.  North Korean weapons experts are developing longer-range 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (e.g. the Taep’o-Dong II) that, in the near future, will be 
capable of delivering chemical and biological agents as well as conventional and fission 
warheads to the western coast of the United States and Alaska [CIA 2001].  North Korea 
has announced that it has developed nuclear weapons.  It is vital that we understand what 








Figure 2. Depiction of maximum ranges of North Korean Scud-B, Scud-C, and 
No-Dong theater ballistic missiles.   






C.  CURRENT PROGRAMMED DEFENSE SYSTEMS 
The following platforms are part of the joint missile defense architecture and are 
used in our scenario to represent the defending forces.  Adding additional future systems, 
such as the Airborne Laser (ABL), is trivial.  
  
 
Figure 3. Current programmed defense platforms 
Shown left to right are a THAAD launch vehicle, an AEGIS Guided Missile Cruiser 
firing a standard missile, and a PATRIOT launch vehicle. 
 
1. Army PATRIOT 
The Army’s PATRIOT is currently deployed and has seen use most recently in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom.  PATRIOT provides a terminal defense against ballistic 
missiles, cruise missiles and aircraft.  PATRIOT consists of a mobile launcher, a phased 
array air search and tracking radar, various command and support vehicles, and is capable 
of firing three interceptor missiles; the PAC-2, PAC-2 GEM, and PAC-3 [Jane’s 2003c].     
2.  Army THAAD 
The Army’s THAAD (Theater High Altitude Air Defense) system is in 
development.  THAAD will provide a midcourse-high altitude defense of ballistic 
missiles using a kinetic-kill interceptor.  THAAD consists of a mobile launcher, a phased 





3.  Navy AEGIS 
Navy AEGIS refers to deployed Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruisers and 
Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers.  Each of these ships has the AEGIS SPY-
1 phased array radar and can function as a ballistic missile interceptor platform.  Each 
ship class is currently deployed with Standard Missile-2 (SM2) variants that provide 
terminal defense against cruise missiles and aircraft.  The Navy is developing the 
Standard Missile-3 (SM3), a kinetic-kill exo-atmospheric interceptor that will provide a 
midcourse defense from ballistic missiles [Jane’s 2003b]. 
 
D.  CURRENT PLANNING TOOLS 
1.  Area Air Defense Commander (AADC) System (AN/UYQ-89) 
AADC has been developed for the Navy and is currently deployed on command 
ships USS BLUERIDGE, USS MOUNT WHITNEY, the AEGIS cruiser USS SHILOH 
and at the Joint National Integration Center (JNIC) in Colorado [Jane’s 2003a].   
AADC consists of a planning and operations module that allows air defense 
commanders to plan and war-game many “what-if” scenarios, to analyze proposed 
defensive interceptor positioning, and monitor current events in near real-time on a three-
dimensional projection of the battle space.   
AADC uses a server farm to exhaustively enumerate theater ballistic defensive 
solutions that consist of every feasible attack combination of enemy launch point, 
defended asset and friendly interceptor platform position to a high degree of fidelity.  
AADC positions forces to defend each asset at or above a specified probability of 
intercept before defending any lower-priority asset.  AADC provides an estimate of 
defense coverage and an expected number of enemy missiles that will get through the 
defense design.   
2.  Theater Battle Management Core Systems (TBMCS) 
TBMCS is used by U.S. Air Force air operations centers for theater-level planning 
in support of the Area Air Defense Commander. 
TBMCS supports strategic planning, air battle planning, mission preparation, 
mission execution and reporting and analysis on near real-time situations as they unfold.  
4 
TBMCS automates a heuristic cookie-cutter overlay of potential launch fans by defensive 
interceptor envelopes; this heuristic suggests a face-valid solution, but one of unknown 
quality.  There is no formal evaluation or optimization of a suggested defensive solution.  
Nor is there a mechanism to represent what the enemy would do in response to observing 
defensive preparations. 
3. Commander’s Analysis and Planning Simulation (CAPS) 
 CAPS was developed by SPARTA, Inc. for the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) 
in 1993.  CAPS is currently hosted by theater ballistic missile planning cells of Central 
Command, European Command, Pacific Command, Strategic Command, the Naval 
Postgraduate School, and others, totaling over 50 sites. 
CAPS is used to assess defense system capabilities and positioning, develop a 
defense design, and to test the performance of the defense design over a hypothesized, 
manually-prepared threat scenario with respect to a manually-prepared defense design 
[Sparta 2004].  The CAPS operator selects the best-looking defense design that protects 
defended targets with high probability and appears to maximize the number of potential 
engagements the defender has against the specified attack scenario.     
All three of these fielded systems solve the complex problem of ballistic missile 
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II. DEFENSIVE PLANNING WITH A NEW, TWO-SIDED 
OPTIMIZATION 
We express the enemy courses of action as a mathematical optimization to 
maximize expected damage, and then show how to optimize our defensive asset 
prepositioning to minimize the maximum achievable expected damage. 
A. TBMD TERMINOLOGY 
1.  Geography 
Each launch site for attacking missiles is located by latitude and longitude.  There 
may be an arbitrary number of dispersed launch sites.  Inclusion of additional launch sites 
is trivial. 
Each target vulnerable to enemy attack is located by latitude and longitude.  
There may be an arbitrary number of dispersed targets.   
Each target has a target value that is agreed upon by the attacker and defender. 
Each candidate defender position is located by latitude and longitude.  Candidate 
positions are discretized into a field of grid points with desired geographic fidelity.  E.g., 
a 0.1-degree mesh grid conveys fidelity no worse than 6 nautical miles between candidate 
positions.  For planning purposes, a 1-degree (60 nm) grid is likely adequate. 
2. Defended Asset List 
Each defended asset target may be a point target, or an area target: this distinction 
influences how we account for expected attack damage. 
3.  Enemy Course of Action 
Each enemy missile has a minimum and maximum range, and can hit any target 
within this range interval with a probability of kill.  This probability can depend on the 
missile type, target, and range from launch site to target. 




An enemy attack consists of a maximal launch of enemy missile(s) from each 
enemy launch site against any or all vulnerable targets.  The enemy goal is to maximize 
total expected target damage.  If a vulnerable target is an area target, expected damage is 
additive by attack. 
4.  Friendly Course of Action 
Each defender class consists of a given number of individual platforms, each 
endowed with a loadout of a given number of each type of interceptor weapon (e.g. 
missile).  Each defending platform may be located at any candidate defender position 
secure and compatible for its class.  (I.e., ships may only be positioned at sea, land units 
on compatible terrain, and air defenders in safe airspace.) 
Any attacking missile may be engaged by any defending platform with an 
intercept salvo of any number of any types of interceptor missiles available on that 
defending platform.  For planning purposes, and as a matter of effective tactical doctrine, 
we assume that the planned intercept of each enemy missile will be executed by just one 
defending platform.  {In actual execution, however, this would not preclude defending 
platforms from providing a layered defense of defended targets.} 
The probability that an intercept salvo will kill the attacking missile is a function 
of the attack launch location, missile type, target location, defender location, defending 
salvo, and the joint (synergistic) effectiveness of all intercepting missiles in that intercept 
salvo. 
The geography of such an engagement can be depicted as an oblate spherical 
triangle, with apexes at the locations of launch site, target, and defender position.  The 
probability of intercept salvo kill is then an arbitrary function of these geographic 
proximities and locations, the vulnerability of the attacking missile as it travels over its 
flyout trajectory, and the joint effectiveness of the entire intercept salvo.  In practice, we 
might use either a mathematical approximation, and/or some engineering estimate 
tabulated in a “cross-range, down-range” probability of kill table for each intercept salvo 
type and missile altitude.  An intercept salvo kill probability does not rely on an 
independence assumption among and between individual intercepting missiles in the 
salvo. 
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B.  MATHMATICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ATTACKER AND DEFENDER 
OPTIMIZATIONS 
There is a set of launch locations L and missile types M, with  of type 
 at location l  available, a set of targets T, with each  having target value 
.  An attack a  consists of a launch from location l  of a missile type 
 at a target t  that will hit the target with probability .  The attacker’s 
















Figure 4. Illustration of attack lexicon  
An attack a consists of a location  launching a missile type  at a 
target  and expecting to hit the target with probability .  If the target 





te a tk value
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The defender has a set of defending platform classes, C, a set of defending 
platforms P, each of class , which can be pre-positioned at geographic locations 
G.  Each platform class c has a set of locations G  at which it can be placed.  Each 
class c carries defensive interceptor types I, with loadout , interceptors of type i I  
available to platform class .  An attack a can be engaged with alternate defensive 
actions D, where defense  launches  interceptors and succeeds in 











, , ,a c g dPk
 
Figure 5. Illustration of defense lexicon 
An attack a may be met with a defensive action launched by a class c 
platform in position g exercising defense alternative d that launches an 
interceptor type i (or, more generally,  interceptors), and thwart 
the attack with probability . 
, , ,a c d isalvo
, , ,a c g dPk
The defender’s problem is to optimize defensive pre-positioning for attack 
interception while (perhaps) assuming the attacker will observe these preparations and 
optimize attacks to exploit any weaknesses in these defenses.  Our objective is to 
minimize the maximum total expected damage to targets. 
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1. Indices and Index Sets 
l L∈   launch location 
m M∈  attacking missile type 
t T∈   target, defended asset 
a A∈   attack launching a missile at a target 
al   launch location of attack a, l L  a ∈
am   missile type launched in attack a,  am M∈
at   target of attack a,   at T∈
p P∈   defending platform 
c C∈   defending platform class 
pc   class of platform p,  pc C∈
g G∈   candidate stationing location for a defending platform 
c cg G G∈ ⊆  candidate stationing location for a defending platform of class c 
i I∈   defensive interceptor type 
d D∈   defense option 
b B∈   Bender’s iteration 
 
2. Data [units] 
,l mmissiles  launch location l supply of missile type m [missiles] 
tvalue   value of target t [value] 
ak   probability that attack a hits its target t  [fraction] a
tmax_missiles  maximum number of missiles that can attack target t [missiles] 
,c iloadout  type i interceptors carried by a class c platform [interceptors] 
, , ,a c d isalvo  defending against attack a, a class c platform exercising defense 
option d will use this number of type i interceptors [interceptors] 
, , ,a c g dPk  probability that attack a would be intercepted if a class c platform 
in location g exercises defense option d [fraction] 
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3. Variables [units] 
aY   1 if attack conducted, 0 otherwise [binary] 
,p gX   1 if platform p located at g, 0 otherwise [binary] 
, , ,a p g dR  1 if attack a is engaged by platform p in location g exercising 
defense option d, 0 otherwise [binary] 
 
4. Minimax Optimization of Expected Damage [dual variables] 
 






. . , (a1) [ ]min
(a2) [ ]




t a a c g d a p g d aY a p P g G d D
a l m




value k Pk R Y
s t Y missiles l L m M








   
−        ≤ ∀ ∈ ∈   








The attacker’s objective is to maximize expected target damage (a0).  Constraints 
(a1) limit the number of missiles available by launch location.  Constraints (a2) limit the 
maximum number of missiles that can be launched at each target.  Constraints (a3) limit 
each attack to at most one missile. 
The objective expresses expected incremental target value inflicted as a 
consequence of each attacking missile.  For a point target that might be substantially 
damaged or destroyed by any single attacking missile, there is no joint probability 
expression for surviving more than one, and this will multiply-credit target value unless 
we use constraint (a2) to allow at most one attacking missile.  For an area target, such as 
a city or airfield, this is not an issue:  each attacking missile damages its own, incremental 
expected target value. 
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5. Limits on defender’s actions 
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Constraints (d1) limit each platform to occupy at most one grid location, 
constraints (d2) (optionally) limit each grid location to accommodate at most one 
platform, constraints (d3) allow at most one interception of each attack, constraints (d4) 
limit the number of engagements from each platform, from each grid point, and 
constraints (d5) and (d6) require binary decisions. 
The attacker plans to maximize expected damage, and the defender plans to 
minimize the attacker’s maximal expected damage. 
If the defender can completely conceal his preparations, and the attacker acts 
optimally in ignorance of the defender’s disposition of forces, we can emulate the results 
by solving the inner, optimal attack problem, and then the outer, optimal defense 
problem.  This is the best the defender can hope to achieve if the attacker acts optimally. 
Suppose the attacker can see the defender’s preparations. 
If the defender cannot see what the attacker does, he can still preposition his 
defending interceptors and commit their missiles to potential attacks as follows. 
, , , , , ,{ , } , ,
max (1 ) ( 0)
a pa t a c g d a p g dX R a p P g G d D
k value Pk R g
∈Χ
∈ ∈ ∈
−∑ ∑ . 
The defender positions platforms and commits interceptors to maximally protect 
target value. 
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Suppose both parties can observe each other’s preparations.  For fixed R, and if 
 and  are integer, the attacker’s maximizing problem is a linear 
program that will render an intrinsically integer optimal attack solution Y .  Exploiting 
this key observation, we substitute the dual of the attacker’s maximizing linear program 
yielding a mixed integer linear program. 
,l mmissiles tmax_salvo
*
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Using a feasible binary defense location plan *X  and interception plan *R  from 
this integer linear program, we can recover the associated binary attack plan Y  by 
solving the attacker’s original maximizing linear program for this fixed 
*
*X  and *R . 
The integer linear program can be embellished as long as the modifications can be 
expressed linearly in{ . , }X R ∈Χ
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The distinguishing feature here is that the attacker can see the defender’s 
preparations, and vice versa.  Thus, the interpretation of the interception variables *R  
changes from “shoot these missiles” to “commit these missiles to intercept that potential 
launch.”  Not all interceptions will actually be executed because the attacker may 
abandon attack options that he sees can and will be intercepted. 
7. Relationship Between Two-sided Model and Game Theory 
The similarity between our transparent two-sided (attacker-defender) model and a 
classical two-person zero sum (TPZS) game is compelling.  We clearly model two 
opponents.  Given fixed attack, defense, and engagement decisions, the resulting 
expected damage is a function of these quantities, and is therefore uniquely defined 
regardless of the order in which we fix them.  Anything the attacker gains, the defender 
counts as a loss, so we have a zero-sum objective function.  Finally, we have finite (albeit 
enormous) decision spaces for both attacker and defender.  The transparent model can, in 
principle, be put into the context of TPZS game theory. 
The attacker has as his decision space the set of all possible attacks he can mount 
(which correspond to all extreme points of the polyhedron defined by the constraints in 
the attacker subproblem), and the defender has all platform prepositions and engagements 
available to him.  The cardinalities of both of these decision spaces are exponential in the 
basic parameters of the scenario, (number of launch sites, missiles, targets, platforms, 
grid locations, etc.), and therefore enumeration of the payoff matrix is practically 
impossible.  Our transparent two-sided model enables us to determine a near-optimal 
solution to the min-max problem associated with this payoff matrix in a reasonable 
amount of time. 
8. Bender’s Decomposition of the Two-Sided Integer Linear Program 
Applying Bender’s decomposition to this two-sided integer linear program yields 
for any admissible candidate engagement plan , , ,
b
a p g dR  the linear programming 
subproblem: 
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And, given a sub-problem solution baY  (that is always integral), the corresponding 
master problem is: 
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For a given defense plan *, *X R , we can recover an optimal (integral) attack plan 









9. Bender’s Decomposition of the Two-Sided Integer Linear Program 
With Multi-Cuts 
Replacing Z with ,  aZ a A∈ , we can restate the decomposition master problem: 
( )
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In this master problem, a cut (c6) is generated for each attack option a the first 
time a sub-problem chooses it.  If all A  of these cut constraints are active, they are 
evidently equivalent to constraints (t1).  This strong Benders multi-cut decomposition is 
strongly reminiscent of the “cover cut” decomposition of Israeli and Wood [2002], where 
each successive master problem is restricted by a cut requiring that the restricted solution 
differ in at least one detail from any prior solution.  E.g., 
, , , , , ,
, , , , , ,
( , , , )| 0 ( , , , )| 1
(1 ) 1 1,2,...
b b
a p g d a p g d
a p g d a p g d
a A p P g G d D R a A p P g G d D R
R R
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ = ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ =
+ − ≥∑ ∑ b =  
The distinguishing difference between their decomposition and ours is that with 
each iteration we gain an objective assessment of solution quality --- a lower bound on 




10. Assessing the Value of Defender Secrecy 
We have presented one model that assumes perfect defender secrecy, and another 
than assumes that both attacker and defender have perfect intelligence about each other.  
We now propose a model that expresses what happens if the defender can keep the 
locations and intentions of at least some of his interceptor platforms secret. 
To do this, partition the defending platforms: 
{ , },p P SEEN SECRET SEEN SECRET∈ = ∧ = ∅  
Using this shorthand for the defender’s decision variables and resources, the 
transparent model is: 
( )
, ,, , ,{ , }
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Given two-sided transparent interceptor commitments *R , induce the associated attack 
plan by solving, e.g., (s0 – s3) with *R R=  for Y , and locate secret platforms and 
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The resulting mathematical formulation is an integer linear program that 
recommends optimal stationing locations and interdictions for defender assets by 
minimizing the enemies’ ability to inflict damage.  Defender optimal interdiction strategy 
accounts for the launch sites of the attack, the missile types used and the targets attacked.  
Additionally, we balance interceptor capabilities and defender platform inventory to 
minimize the expected number of enemy ballistic missiles that penetrate the air defenses.  
Defender interdiction strategy is further constrained by linking interceptor capabilities to 
the oblate spherical triangle formed by the geographic coordinates of the attacker launch 
site, target, and defender location, which depend on the attack the enemy chooses in the 
assignment model.  The result is an integer linear program that recommends optimal 
stationing positions for defender platforms that minimize the maximum expected damage 
of an enemy attack.  The goal is to produce a provably optimal, face-valid defender plan 
on a portable computer.  
 
C.  A NOTIONAL NORTH KOREAN SCENARIO, CIRCA 2010 
There is no perfect defense system, so we anticipate that some fraction of the 
attacker’s ballistic missiles will penetrate our air defense.  Friendly forces will intercept 
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incoming ballistic missiles until they are all destroyed or until the intercepting units 
exhaust their capacity and are overwhelmed by the incoming strike.  Defending forces 
will attempt to minimize the number of ballistic missiles that are not intercepted and 
reach their intended target; thereby minimizing the expected damage inflicted.  The goal 
of the joint forces commander is to station defending interceptors in positions that 
minimize, in some sense, damage to the defended targets. 
We have developed a North Korean scenario, circa 2010, in which we specify a 
North Korean arsenal of ballistic missiles and launch sites, a U.S. contingent of ballistic 
missile defense platforms, and a list of targets with associated target values.  We use this 
scenario to evaluate proposed theater ballistic missile defense options.  In developing this 
scenario we have made some assumptions.  The following data are used for our planning 
scenario and remain fixed throughout the analysis. 
1.  Attacker Launch Sites 
The attacker candidate launch sites are based upon actual North Korean known 
missile facilities and bases from unclassified sources [FAS 2003b].  Table 2 enumerates 
the notional North Korean missile launch sites, and Figure 6 shows the approximate 
locations overlaid on a map of North Korea.  
Degrees Minutes Degrees Minutes
Chiha-ri 38 37 126 41
Chunggang-up 41 46 126 53
Kanggamchan 40 24 125 12
Kanggye 40 7 126 35
Man'gyongdae-ri 38 59 125 40
Mayang 40 0 128 11
Namgung-ni 39 8 125 46
No-dong 40 50 129 40
Ok'pyong 39 17 127 18
Paegun 39 58 124 35
Pyongyang 39 0 125 45
Sangwon 38 50 126 5
Sunchon 39 25 125 55
Tokch'on 39 45 126 15
Toksong 40 25 128 10
Yongo-dong 41 59 129 58
Latitude (N) Longitude (E)Launch Sites
 
Table 1. North Korean scenario launch sites (after fas.org[2003b]) 
These launch sites are current missile production facilities and missile bases, and 
are used in our scenario as potential launch sites. 
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 Missile Launch Locations
 
Figure 6. North Korean launch locations 
Approximate positions of the North Korean launch sites convey the geographical 
complexity of the scenario. 
 
We distill unclassified sources and notionally position numbers of each type of 
North Korean missile at each candidate launch site.  We assume that the enemy will fire 
any number and types of missiles that will maximize damage.   
2.  Attacker Missiles 
The following missiles are selected from the North Korean inventory.  Missile 
characteristics are notional, compiled from unclassified sources [e.g., Jane’s 2003d].  
Each missile is assumed to be 100-percent reliable, and if not intercepted has a 100-
percent probability of hit ( =1.0) against its intended target.  This expresses the worst-
case situation.  Table 3 displays the minimum and maximum ranges (in kilometers) of 




Scud-B 40            330           
Scud-C 40            700           
No-Dong 1,350       1,500        
Taep'o-Dong I 2,200       2,900        
Taep'o-Dong II 3,500       4,300        
Range (km)Missile 
 
Table 2. North Korean ballistic missile types with their range limits 
 
a.  Missiles Available  
Table 3 lists the maximum number and type of North Korean ballistic 
missiles allocated to each launch location.   
Launch Sites Scud-B Scud-C No-Dong Taepo-Dong I Taepo-Dong II
Chiha-ri 15                    20                    10                    
Chunggang-up 10                    10                    
Kanggamchan 15                    10                    
Kanggye 15                    10                    
Man'gyongdae-ri 10                    20                    10                    
Mayang 15                    20                    1                       1                       
Namgung-ni 5                      15                    2                      
No-dong 5                      15                    1                       1                       
Ok'pyong 15                    15                    10                    
Paegun 15                    10                    
Pyongyang 15                    15                    10                    
Sangwon 15                    20                    10                    
Sunchon 5                      15                    10                    
Tokch'on 5                      15                    15                    
Toksong 5                      15                    15                    
Yongo-dong 20                    1                       1                        
Table 3. North Korean ballistic missiles available by launch location. 
b. Maximum Attacks  
We assess an attack that allows a defended asset target to be attacked at 
most once.  Increasing the number of attacks per target is trivial. 
3.  Targets on a Defended Asset List 
Figure 7 displays the defended asset list (DAL) and target values for our scenario.  
Estimating target value is important because we need to infer the attacker’s motives.  We 
assume that the attacker will have some foreknowledge of our strengths, weaknesses and 
critical nodes and will attack targets that are important to us.  Representing target values 
that have meaning is an important preparatory step to get sensible defense results.   
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We generate target values based upon a subjective assessment of the four factors 
currently used in air defense planning:  criticality, vulnerability, reconstitutability and 
threat [Army 2004]. 
a. Criticality (c) 
Criticality is a judgment of the degree to which one of our defended assets 
is essential to us.  A high value indicates that the asset is extremely critical to us.  A low 
value indicates otherwise. 
b.  Vulnerability (v) 
Vulnerability is an evaluation of the degree to which a target is susceptible 
to an air or missile attack or is vulnerable to surveillance.  A high value indicates that the 
target is extremely vulnerable, unprotected and in the open with clear lines of approach.  
A low value indicates otherwise.  
c.  Reconstitutability (r) 
Reconstitutability is an assessment of the degree to which the target can 
recover from inflicted damage in terms of time, equipment, and available manpower to 
resume normal operation.  A high value indicates that the target would need considerable 
time, equipment and/or manpower to return to normal operation following an attack.  A 
low value indicates otherwise.  
d.  Threat (t) 
Threat is an estimate of the probability of our asset being attacked by our 
enemy.  A high value indicates that it is nearly certain that the enemy is or will attack this 
target.  A low value indicates otherwise. 
Combining these factors, our target , is: tvalue
( )ln * * * 1tvalue c v r t= + , 
where  c, v, r, t  range from 1-10 and  can range from 1.0 to slightly more than 
10.0.  The natural log function (ln) was chosen to convert the product of c, v, r, and t 
units to a target utility that retains partial order between any target pair and exhibits a 
range of values not too unlike those of each factor. 
tvalue
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Target Target Value
 Seoul 4 8 5 9 8.3
 Pusan 8 7 8 10 9.4
 Inchon 3 6 5 4 6.9
 Chinhae 7 7 7 8 8.9
 OsanAB 10 8 9 10 9.9
 Kunsan 10 7 9 10 9.7
 Tokyo 4 9 4 7 7.9
 Yokosuka 8 8 7 7 9.1
 Sasebo 7 8 7 7 8.9
 Okinawa 7 7 8 3 8.1
 Misawa 8 5 7 5 8.2
 Atsugi 4 7 6 5 7.7
Criticality Vulnerability Reconstitutability Threat
 
Figure 7. Targets on a Defended Asset List (DAL) 
Targets are on this list because of their obvious political or military significance and are 
spread out over South Korea, Japan and Okinawa.  Each target is assigned four scores, 
respectively reflecting criticality, vulnerability, reconstitutability and threat.  For 
example, Seoul has (c,v,r,t) values of (4,8,5,9), which result in a target value of 
. ln(4*8*5*9) 1 8.3+ =
 
4.  Ballistic Missile Accuracy and Target Value Relationship 
The United States categorizes ballistic missiles into four categories based upon 
missile maximum ranges: short-range (less than 1000 km), medium-range (less than 3000 
km), intermediate-range (less than 5500 km) and intercontinental (greater than 5500 km) 
[FAS 2003a]. 
Another characteristic of every missile is an evaluation of its accuracy, usually 
expressed as its circular error probable (CEP), or the radial distance within which a 
missile will impact fifty percent of the time.   
For precision-guided munitions the CEP should be very small, say within meters.  
A weapon with a large CEP, say hundreds of meters, has a much smaller chance of 
hitting its intended target – which equates to a greater probability of generating unwanted 
collateral damage. 
 For illustrative purposes, we compare a notional missile at two different CEP 
levels, 30m and 1000m, and calculate the probability that the missile will land within its 
lethal radius of a fixed target. 
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 Lethal radius is generally determined by the amount of peak overpressure 
generated by the explosion in pounds per square inch (psi).  (This odd juxtaposition of 
English with metric measure is ubiquitous in the weapons effects literature.)  From 
“Introduction to Naval Weapons Engineering” [FAS 2004], we find that a level of 3 psi 
peak overpressure is generally considered to be enough to cause moderate damage to 
troops in the open and to parked aircraft.  The distance at which 1kg of TNT will produce 
a 3psi peak overpressure is 6 meters.  Consider a notional missile with a 1000 kg 
Composition-B warhead.  From the Berthelot approximation, a 1000kg Comp-B warhead 
is equivalent to a 1495kg TNT warhead.  To find the lethal radius of our 1495kg TNT-
equivalent warhead we use the scaling law that is defined as 
1
3
0Wd d W=  where d0 is the distance from 1 kg TNT and dW is the equivalent distance 
from the W kg of TNT explosive. 
3
3
 (1 kg TNT distance (meters))* TNT equivelant warhead weight(kg)




We assert that for theater ballistic missiles, accuracy may not be that important.  
Even if the missile does not impact its exact target, if it is not intercepted it will impact 
somewhere.  Figures 8 and 9 illustrate a 100-shot scatter plot of impact points around a 




Figure 8. 30-meter circular error probable missile impact points 
The inner circle represents a 69m lethal radius; the outer ring is a 500m ring.  
Nearly all 100 shots landed within the lethal radius. 
 
 
Figure 9. 1000-meter circular error probable missile impact points 
0m ring.  
otice the majority of missile impact points are outside the 500m circle. 
The inner circle represents a 69m lethal radius, the outer circle is a 50
N
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 Certainly we can expect that lower CEP-weapons will be more effective against 
specific military targets, but our enemies will use ballistic missiles as weapons of terror – 
weapons designed to inflict a large amount of damage and destruction indiscriminately.  
If a ballistic missile is armed with a nuclear, biological or chemical warhead, it does not 
matter h if oint: close is good enough. 
 class, i.e. cruiser or 
destroy
  Varying the mix of missiles by battery, or the composition of the battery itself, is 
trivial. 
ated radar and 
support icle r of interceptors by battery is trivial. 
forms in our scenario.  Ranges were gleaned from open literature [Jane’s 
2003b,c,e]. 
muc  it hits an exact aim p
5. Defense Platforms 
For our 2010 defense design we have two AEGIS cruisers each, with 10 SM3 and 
20 SM2 interceptors, and one AEGIS destroyer with 20 SM2 interceptors. We assume 
that each AEGIS ship is configured for ballistic missile defense and deployed as an 
independent entity.  Additionally, we assume that each AEGIS platform of each ship 
class is allocated the same interceptor loadout within its same
er.  Varying the interceptor loadout by platform is trivial.   
We can use one PATRIOT battery.  We assume that a deployed PATRIOT battery 
consists of 8 mobile launchers and associated support vehicles, and that each mobile 
launcher is loaded with four PAC-3 missiles, two PAC-2 GEM missiles, and one PAC-2 
missile.
There is also one THAAD battery.  We assume that a deployed THAAD battery 
consists of a mobile launcher containing 10 interceptors and the associ
 veh s.  Varying the numbe
6.  Interceptor Ranges 







 Interceptor Maximum Range (km) 
Thaad           250 
PAC-2          160 
         160 
PAC-3            70 
         120 
PAC-2GEM 
SM2 blk III variants 
SM3                     1,200 
Table 4. Defender interceptor missile ranges 
stems are the Army PATRIOT and AEGIS ships using medium range 
missile
ssile 
trajecto nd the interceptor(s) available to the defender to use to thwart the attack. 
 
 
7.  Interceptor Effectiveness: Probability of Kill (Pk) 
An attacking ballistic missile may follow a “flyout” trajectory that prevents 
certain interceptors from being able to engage from certain defense points.  For example, 
a ballistic missile having a range less than 1000 km does not reach sufficient altitude for 
midcourse interceptors to be effective; therefore such a missile must be engaged by 
terminal defense systems.  Navy AEGIS ships with a high altitude-extended range missile 
and Army THAAD batteries are being developed as our midcourse defense systems.  Our 
terminal defense sy
 variants.   
Our probability of Kill (Pk) is zero or a constant value if feasible engagement 
conditions are met.  We can also represent interceptor effectiveness with a Pk table 
indexed by cross-range and down-range proximity, and by “flyout” altitude.  Pk tables 
condense into a single number the complex relationship between attack launch site, target 







8. Candidate Interceptor Locations 
Our scenario is discretized into a latitude and longitude grid to the nearest degree 
(see Figure 10).  This gives us an approximate sixty nautical mile fidelity with four 
hundred twenty (420) candidate locations; each platform may be positioned at any of an 
appropriate subset of these candidate locations. 
 
 
Figure 10. Candidate defender interceptor locations 
Our grid points are placed at each integer latitude and longitude, and each 
candidate defending platform may be located at a subset of these points (e.g., 
ships only at sea and land-based units on land). 
 D.  
age of the same 
attack against unobserved defenders is the value of defender secrecy. 
 
MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS 
In our scenario we assess the maximum damage an enemy attack can inflict on 
undefended targets given attacker resource constraints.  We then evaluate an optimal 
interception plan for this enemy maximal attack subject to defender resource constraints 
assuming the enemy does not know we are making such plans.  The difference between 
the expected damage from the undefended attack and the expected dam
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Next, we assume that the enemy can see our defensive preparations and that we 
can see his attack preparations, and evaluate the mutually optimal plans that this 
transparency suggests to the attacker and defender.  The resultant expected damage is the 
value of transparency, or more practically – the value of assuming our enemy is smart 
and will attack in a manner that exploits our weaknesses. 
Finally, we evaluate cases where we may be able to keep some defending 
platforms hidden from the enemy, while others can be seen by the attacker.  This adds 




















III. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The ability to express this problem as an integer linear program enables us to 
objectively assess solution quality.  I.e., given our assumptions and data, we can establish 
with absolute certainty how much better any defensive plan might be that we have not 
already discovered. 
A.  A MAXIMAL UNDEFENDED ENEMY ATTACK 
Table 5 represents an optimal attack that fires a single missile at each undefended 
target producing a total expected damage of 93.1. 
Launch Site Missile Type Target
Chihari        ScudC          Sasebo         
Chihari        NoDong1        Okinawa        
Kanggamchan    ScudC          Seoul          
Kanggamchan    ScudC          Chinhae        
Kanggamchan    NoDong1        Tokyo          
Kanggamchan    NoDong1        Yokosuka       
Kanggamchan    NoDong1        Atsugi         
Okpyong        ScudC          Kunsan         
Paegun         NoDong1        Misawa         
Pyongyang      ScudC          Pusan          
Tokchon        ScudC          Inchon          
Table 5. Optimal North Korean attack 
There are no interceptions at all.  Each target is attacked with a single missile 
producing an expected damage of 93.1. 
 
 Figure 11 illustrates what this attack looks like when the launch sites are 
connected to the targets as depicted on a map of the theater. 
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Figure 11. Theater-wide optimal attack 
A maximal attack is shown with at most one missile aimed at each target and no 
interceptions.  Maximum expected damage is 93.1. 
 
B. AN OPTIMAL DEFENSE DESIGN 
Assuming that the attacker does not observe our defensive preparations, we 
position our assets to intercept his optimal attack and reduce his attack to an expected 
damage value of 0.93.  Our defenders know about all attacks ahead of time, so they are 
able to position themselves and engage attacker missiles with interceptors that have a 
high probability of kill.  A reduction in damage to 0.93 equates to approximately one-
tenth of a missile leaking through. 
Defender 
Class Platform Latitude Logitude
AegisCG   CG01 35 125
AegisCG   CG02 31 128
AegisDDG  DDG01 34 126
Patriot   Pbat1          35 129
Thaad     Tbat1          36 136  
Table 6. Optimal defender locations maintaining defense secrecy 
From these (hidden) positions, defending platforms intercept every incoming 
missile, but do not necessarily kill it.  The maximum expected damage is reduced 
to 0.93, or about one-tenth of a missile leaking through. 
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 Figure 12 illustrates the defender positions relative to the attack. 
 
 
Figure 12. Optimal defense, attacker unaware 
This illustrates interceptor engagements by hidden defenders.  Expected damage 
is reduced to 0.93. 
 
C. ASSUME TRANSPARENCY: A TWO-SIDED OPTIMIZATION 
If each side can observe what the other is doing, we find ourselves in a position 
where the attacker knows we may commit an interceptor salvo to each candidate missile 
attack, and shoot it if he launches that attack.  The defender knows that the attacker will 
get some of his missiles through.  The objective for the defense is to minimize the 
maximum expected damage, given the attacker can see and take advantage of our pre-
positioned forces. 
The two-sided attack and defense produces a maximal attack with expected 
damage of 6.1, an overall reduction in expected damage of 93.4 percent.  Table 7 and 8 
illustrate the attack and defense, respectively, and Figure 13 shows what the attack and 
defense look like on a map of the theater. 
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Launch 
Location Missile Type Target
Kanggamchan    ScudC          Seoul          
Pyongyang      ScudC          Pusan          
Tokchon        ScudC          Inchon         
Kanggamchan    ScudC          Chinhae        
Okpyong        ScudC          Kunsan         
Kanggamchan    NoDong1        Tokyo
Kanggamchan    NoDong1        Yokosuka       
Kanggamchan    NoDong1        Misawa         
Kanggamchan    NoDong1        Atsugi
Paegun         NoDong1        Misawa         
Chihari NoDong1        Okinawa  
Table 7. Optimal attack given transparency between defender and attacker 
Each target is attacked with at most one missile.  The attacker knows the defender 





Class Platform Latitude Longitude
AegisCG   CG47           39 130
AegisCG   CG48           34 129
AegisDDG  DDG68          38 130
Patriot   Pbat1          36 128
Thaad     Tbat1          37 138  
Table 8. Optimal defense given transparency between attacker and defender 
Each defender platform is located to minimize the attacker’s worst possible 
attack.  The defender has committed missiles to thwart potential attacks that may 







Figure 13. Optimal two-sided attack and defense design 
Given attacker-defender transparency, expected damage is 6.1, an overall reduction of 
93.4 percent.  Defenders have committed interceptors to potential attacks that are not 
launched for precisely this reason. 
 
 
D. ASSUME PARTIAL TRANSPARENCY 
Suppose that we can keep our naval defender platforms hidden from the attacker, 
knowing that he can observe our land-based defenders.  The resulting expected damage 
moves from the upper bound of total transparency towards the lower bound of total 
defender secrecy.  The difference between the expected damage in the transparent 
solution and the expected damage of this solution is the value of partial defender secrecy.  
In practical terms this value quantifies how an increase in information hiding effort, 
either through funding, tactics or a combination of both, will reduce the attacker’s ability 



































Figure 14. The value of attacker secrecy, and defender secrecy 
This illustrates the expected damage under different amounts of attacker and defender 
secrecy.  The value of secrecy is the positive difference between the expected damage 
under that level of secrecy and the expected damage in the transparent model (e.g., the 
value of perfect defender secrecy is 6.1 - .93 = 5.17). 
 
The value of partial defender secrecy is the difference between the expected 
damage of the perfect transparent solution and the expected damage of the perfect 
defender secrecy solution where we know what the attacks will be and keep all of our 
defender’s hidden from the attacker (e.g. ). 6.1 0.93 5.17− =
The more effort the defender expends to keep his platforms hidden, the closer he 














IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Although providing a quick decision aid in the past, the visual “launch fan” and 
“interceptor envelope” cookie-cutter model is too restrictive for our use.  We see little to 
recommend using such a device when an exigent scenario may involve an arbitrary field 
of launch sites, a variety of attack missile types, and a dispersed defended asset list of 
potential targets.  A launch fan expresses the feasible range of attack tracks of one missile 
type from one launch site to any vulnerable target location.  For our purposes, we account 
for every candidate “attack trajectory” from launch site to target location.  It is important 
to change the paradigms of “launch fans” and “cookie-cutter” interceptor coverage zones 
to reflect an enemy that is smart and capable of knowing and exploiting our weaknesses 
and defense strategies.  The controversy here centers on whether we score our 
interceptions by just killing attacking missiles, or by defending vulnerable targets on our 
defended asset list.  We choose the latter. 
We have produced an integer linear program that expresses this problem using 
well-established methods to selectively enumerate and qualitatively assess solution 
quality.  We model missile attacks with an assignment that maximizes the expected 
damage of an attack despite some defense interception plan.  We assume the enemy 
knows our defended asset list (DAL), agrees with these targets, and can see what our 
defensive prepositions will be.   
We propose a decision support tool that can offer provably optimal interception 
plans on a laptop computer in minutes.  These integer linear programs can be solved 
faster, and can be expected to find a near-optimal solution.  The space and power 
requirements for our solution are trivial.  The Joint Task Force’s Area Air Defense 
Commander (AADC) and Regional Air Defense Commander (RADC) may use this 
decision support tool for initial defense planning and assessment.  Our model gives the 
commander the ability to qualitatively assess the value of hiding information from the 
attacker.  In addition it could provide insight to the ballistic missile defense (BMD) 
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